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A B S T R A C T .  As Americans increasingly use estate planning tools to provide for their favorite 
charities, the charitable trust is an important instrument that fits uniquely into general trust law.  
While charitable trusts are similar to private trusts to a great extent, there are also some critical 
differences between the two vehicles, especially regarding their enforcement.  Specifically, state 
attorneys general play a special role in the enforcement of charitable trusts.  This Note examines 
this special role of the state attorney general—namely, how trustees interact with the attorney 
general, arguments for why the role of the attorney general needs to be reformed or eliminated, 
and arguments in support of letting the attorney general maintain his or her power in these 
charitable trust cases. 
After considering the historical background on charitable trusts, this Note analyzes a recent 
New Hampshire case, In re Nashua Center for the Arts, as an example of how the New Hampshire 
Probate Court affirmed the power of the state Attorney General in this charitable trust setting.  In 
that case, several groups of concerned citizens tried to intervene when the trust for Nashua Center 
for the Arts, part of the Edith Carter estate, announced it would relocate its funds to the Currier 
Museum of Art in Manchester, New Hampshire.  The court denied their motions to intervene 
because only the state Attorney General has the power to represent them—the parties did not have 
standing to intervene on their own.  The Note then explores other New Hampshire cases, 
Massachusetts cases, and legal disputes in other states to provide additional perspectives. 
This Note concludes that while the court’s decision in In re Nashua Center for the Arts initially 
seems like a harsh injustice for the nonprofits in Nashua that felt entitled to make use of the funds 
from Edith Carter’s estate, the court correctly applied the existing law.  The outcome of the case 
should remind nonprofits and citizens in New Hampshire that, while the state has held itself out 
as one of the most progressive states for trust law, the significant powers held by the state 
Attorney General will not be limited any time soon. 
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I NT R ODUC T I ON 
For as long as people have acquired monetary wealth and tangible possessions, 
they have found ways to ensure that those assets go to certain individuals or 
organizations once they, as the owner, pass away.1  While many people use estate 
planning tools to provide for their family members or closest friends, a significant 
number of individuals would prefer that their assets go to a particular charity.2  
Overall, Americans gave over $410 billion to charity in 2017, which was a roughly five 
percent increase from the amount of charitable giving in 2016.3  Of that $410 billion, 
around nine percent, or $35.70 billion, came from charitable bequests.4  The U.S. 
Legal Wills website—offering statistical findings from a sample of over 10,000 wills 
created through the website’s service—reveals that slightly more than seven percent 
of the service’s users included a charitable bequest in their will.5  While that 
percentage may not seem overly significant, the billions of dollars donated through 
these charitable bequests have the potential to enhance communities in 
innumerable ways. 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of charitable trusts—how they are 
defined, how they have evolved throughout history, what they require, and how they 
differ from individuals’ private trusts.  Charitable trusts are not unique to the 
United States.6  The idea of forming charitable trusts began in England and was 
                                                                    
1  See generally James Greig, What an Ancient Egyptian Will Has to Tell Us About Inheritance Today, 
Blake Morgan (Aug. 18, 2014), https://www.blakemorgan.co.uk/training-knowledge/features-
and-articles/ancient-egyptian-inheritance-today/ [https://perma.cc/VVT4-S4SA].  One of the 
earliest recorded testaments is the will of Naunakhte, a woman living in Egypt over 3000 years 
ago.  Id.  Naunakhte’s will lists her eight children and disinherits three of them because those three 
children allegedly did not take care of Naunakhte as she grew older.  Id.   
2  Charitable Giving Statistics, Nat'l Philanthropic Tr., http://www.nptrust.org/philanthropic
-resources/charitable-giving-statistics [https://perma.cc/W42L-QMQS] (last visited Feb. 14, 2019). 
3  Id. (noting a 5.2% increase). 
4  Id. 
5  Tim Hewson, Planned Giving: The State of Charitable Bequests in the U.S., U.S. Legal Wills Blog 
(Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.uslegalwills.com/blog/planned-giving [https://perma.cc/R8ZY-5TW7].  
USLegalWills.com provides a range of legal document creation services to the public, allowing 
users to create common legal documents themselves online.  See About Us, U.S. Legal Wills, 
https://www.uslegalwills.com/AboutUs [https://perma.cc/C6HK-RVDS] (last visited Feb. 14, 
2019).  Users can create wills, living wills, and powers of attorney through various different pricing 
models, and attorneys are available to give users advice about their documents upon request.  
Products & Prices, U.S. Legal Wills, https://www.uslegalwills.com/Prices [https://perma.cc/MZ43-
KY6D] (last visited Feb. 14, 2019).   
6  See infra Part I, section A. 
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adopted by colonists in America.7  While American colonists were initially wary of 
using trusts for charitable purposes because of misuse by their former countrymen, 
they gradually developed a more positive opinion of the trusts once the United 
States became established.8 
In Part II, I explore the differences between charitable trusts and private 
trusts—in particular the special role that state attorneys general play in the 
charitable trust’s enforcement.  The historical background will show that state 
legislatures and courts have consistently given their attorney general significant 
powers in these enforcement cases.  I present numerous examples from certain 
well-known charitable trusts throughout several states to reinforce this point. 
In order to tie together the information from Parts I and II, and to analyze an 
example of how the interaction between attorneys general and charitable trust 
issues currently plays out in New Hampshire, in Part III I explain the controversy 
underlying In re Nashua Center for the Arts.9  In 2017, the City of Nashua and four 
nonprofit groups involved in the arts and community development filed motions to 
intervene when the Nashua Center for the Arts (NCA) sought permission to relocate 
its funds to the Currier Museum of Art in Manchester, New Hampshire.10  The court 
held that the plaintiffs did not have standing because they were members of the 
public whose interests did not meet the requisite level of specificity or uniqueness.11  
This case affirmed the New Hampshire Attorney General’s power to represent 
members of the public when enforcing charitable trusts, just as the law currently 
requires.12 
In Part IV, I highlight several Massachusetts cases involving plaintiffs who 
challenged the administration of charitable trusts.  While In re Nashua Center for the 
Arts is noteworthy for several reasons, it is just one of many recent cases.  
Furthermore, given that New Hampshire is a relatively small state lacking an 
overabundance of case law on this topic, cases from Massachusetts provide 
additional insight.  These Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decisions support 
the reasoning behind the probate court’s ruling in In re Nashua Center for the Arts.  
This shows that even though New Hampshire has taken a more progressive 
approach to trust law in general, the state’s standard granting power to the attorney 
                                                                    
7  See infra Part I, section A.  
8  6 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 577 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., LexisNexis 
Matthew Bender 2018) [hereinafter Powell on Real Property]. 
9  No. 316-2017-EQ-00191 (N.H. Cir. Ct. 9th Prob. Div. Aug. 30, 2017). 
10  See id. at 1. 
11  See id. at 5–6. 
12  See id. at 6. 
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general is not particularly unique. 
In Part V, I consider several solutions for how to improve the existing scheme.  
Some scholars advocate for eliminating state attorneys general from the process 
while others believe that the powers of state attorneys general should simply be 
limited.  On the other hand, there are compelling arguments for not changing the 
attorney general’s role at all.  New Hampshire and other jurisdictions could benefit 
from considering different approaches to this problem in order to ensure that the 
people still have a voice in disputes over charitable trusts. 
Finally, this Note concludes by bringing some closure to this issue that has 
stymied nonprofits and individuals in charitable trust disputes.  There is likely no 
easy solution that would please every party in a charitable trust suit.  The donor is 
no longer able to reiterate his or her intentions, and different parties—each with 
their own compelling arguments—are competing for limited resources.  While at a 
first glance the decision in In re Nashua Center for the Arts may seem unfair to the 
intervening parties, this Note concludes that the probate court correctly applied 
New Hampshire law and remained consistent with the law on charitable trusts as it 
has developed throughout history and currently exists in several other jurisdictions. 
I .  OV E R V I E W 
A. Charitable Trusts: What Are They and How Did They Develop? 
The Restatement of Trusts (Second) defines a charitable trust as “a fiduciary 
relationship with respect to property arising as a result of a manifestation of an 
intention to create it, and subjecting the person by whom the property is held to 
equitable duties to deal with the property for a charitable purpose.”13  Charitable 
purposes include, but are not limited to the following: “the relief of poverty; the 
advancement of education; the advancement of religion; the promotion of health; 
[and] governmental or municipal purposes.”14  Other purposes that are “beneficial 
to the community” will also suffice.15 
Like many facets of American jurisprudence, the history of charitable trust law 
began in England.16  One of the practical reasons why the English began to form 
charitable trusts was due to the ongoing strife between the government and the 
                                                                    
13  Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 348 (Am. Law Inst. 1959). 
14  Id. § 368. 
15  Id. 
16  See Powell on Real Property, supra note 8. 
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Church regarding land ownership.17  Charitable trusts existed under the common 
law, but the Statute of Charitable Uses, enacted in 1601, “helped validate and 
reinforce the concept of the charitable trust.”18  The Statute of Charitable Uses 
contained basic information about what qualified as a charitable purpose, along 
with how to enforce charitable trusts.19  The procedures were later repealed, but the 
list of what satisfied the definition of a charitable purpose remained, and those 
enumerated purposes have influenced the development of charitable trust law to 
this day.20  
Before the English settlers in North America formed their new government and 
culture, charitable trusts were a “disfavored vehicle.”21  Due to their previous 
experiences living under certain governing statutes in England, the colonists 
brought with them a general distrust of unlimited charitable gifts, and among at 
least some of the new states, there seemed to be misconceptions about the 1601 
Statute of Charitable Uses.22  Much of this distrust can be traced back to the tension 
in England between the Church and State regarding control over valuable pieces of 
land.23  Additionally, one of the reasons for early Americans’ dismissal of charitable 
trust vehicles could be related to how the newcomers in their “growing pioneer 
country” prioritized “the development of business, industry, and trade [rather] than 
. . . the development of charities.”24  However, those attitudes gradually changed as 
the United States became more established.25  The United States Supreme Court 
                                                                    
17  See id. 
18  Id. 
19  Id. §§ 577, 578.  The preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses enumerated nine different 
types of gifts regulated by the law.  See id. § 578.  For example, gifts for the “maintenance of sick 
and maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of learning, free schools and scholars in universities,” 
and gifts for the “education and preferment of orphans” qualified under the Statute.  Id.  The 
original procedures allowed the Lord Chancellor to award commissions to bishops and other 
officials in order to investigate any potential abuses of charitable gifts.  See id. § 577.  
20  See id. § 577. 
21  Id. 
22  See id. 
23  See id. (explaining how some medieval statutes limited the transfer of lands to the church, as 
such transfers were considered less advantageous to the King, but devices to evade those 
limitations “took the form of ‘uses,’ i.e., the forerunner of the modern trust”).  
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
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acknowledged charitable trusts in 1844,26 and courts have increasingly issued 
decisions with more liberal interpretations on these matters.27 
Charitable trusts also allow the settlor to preserve income, estate, and gift tax 
charitable deductions, all while “accomodat[ing] split-interest transfers.”28  There 
are several different types of charitable trusts: charitable remainder unitrusts, 
charitable remainder annuity trusts, charitable lead unitrusts, charitable lead 
annuity trusts, and pooled income funds.29 
B. How Do Charitable Trusts Differ from Private Trusts? 
A general understanding of trust law is helpful for analyzing the specific issues 
for charitable trusts.  Like private trusts, charitable trusts have settlors, 
beneficiaries, and trustees.30  The settlor is “[t]he person who creates a trust,” and a 
trust may have more than one settlor.31  The person who holds property in the trust 
is the trustee.32  The beneficiary is “the person for whose benefit property is held in 
trust.”33  There are, however, some critical distinctions that make charitable trusts 
unique.  In a private trust, “property is devoted to the use of specified persons who 
are designated as beneficiaries of the trust,” but the property in a charitable trust is 
designated for “purposes beneficial to the community.”34  Additionally, a charitable 
trust can be valid without designating a “definitely ascertainable beneficiary,” and 
it can continue for an indefinite period of time.35  A private express trust, on the 
other hand, cannot be created in that fashion—it must have a definitely ascertained 
beneficiary at creation or in accordance with the Rule Against Perpetuities.36 
                                                                    
26  See Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 197 (1844) (holding that the trust at issue in the 
case was valid as a charitable trust under Pennsylvania common law).  
27  See Powell on Real Property, supra note 8. 
28  3 J. Martin Burke, Michael K. Friel & Elaine Hightower Gagliardi, Modern Estate 
Planning § 41.02 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. ed., 2d ed. 2018). 
29  Id.  
30  See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 348 cmt. a, d (Am. Law Inst. 1959) (discussing who 
is the trustee, beneficiary, and settlor in a private trust).   
31  Id. § 3(1). 
32  Id. § 3(3). 
33  Id. § 3(4). 
34  Id. § 1, cmt. c. 
35  Id. at ch. 11, introductory note. 
36  Id.; see Rule Against Perpetuities, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining the Rule 
Against Perpetuities as a common law property rule that prohibits “a grant of an estate unless the 
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Furthermore, the doctrine of cy pres does not apply to private trusts, but it does 
apply to charitable trusts.37  The Restatement defines the doctrine as follows: 
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose, and it 
is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the particular purpose, 
and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to devote the property to 
charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the court will direct the application of the 
property to some charitable purpose which falls within the general charitable intention 
of the settlor.38 
While a settlor likely forms a charitable trust because he or she has a special 
affinity for the charitable purpose that the trust would serve, charitable trusts are 
appealing in other ways.  For example, some state laws provide that property held 
in a charitable trust is insulated from third parties “to whom liabilities in tort have 
been incurred in the administration of the trust.”39  Additionally, charitable trusts 
might be treated differently for tax purposes, depending on the relevant statutes.40  
Many of these differences exist because trust law is a function of state law.  The 
Uniform Trust Code (UTC) provides a standard baseline for trust law.  However, it 
is “primarily a default statute,” and states have enacted different versions of the 
UTC.41 
Finally, there are differences between how private trusts and charitable trusts 
are enforced.  While a private trust’s beneficiaries may sue to enforce the private 
trust, a charitable trust “is ordinarily enforceable at the suit of a public officer, 
usually the Attorney General.”42  The Restatement explains that several types of 
individuals cannot bring a suit to enforce a charitable trust: “persons who have no 
special interest or . . . the settlor or his heirs, personal representatives or next of 
kin.”43  That difference is the focus of this Note. 
                                                                    
interest must vest, if at all, no later than 21 years (plus a period of gestation to cover a posthumous 
birth) after the death of some person alive when the interest was created”). 
37  Restatement (Second) of Trusts ch. 11, introductory note. 
38  Id. § 399. 
39  Id. at ch. 11, introductory note. 
40  See id. 
41  Unif. Trust Code art. 1 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2000). 
42  Restatement (Second) of Trusts ch. 11, introductory note.  
43  Id. § 391. 
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I I .  T HE  R OL E  OF  T HE  S T A T E  AT T OR NE Y  GE N E R AL  
A. History 
A state attorney general’s involvement in overseeing charitable trust issues is 
not a recent invention.44  Just as charitable trusts began in England, the role of the 
attorney general can be traced back to English common law.45  Eventually, the 
attorneys general in colonial America exercised significant power.46  By the end of 
the nineteenth century, the root of the state attorney general’s authority was 
defined by the power of parens patriae.47  Parens patriae is a Latin phrase that 
translates to “parent of his or her country,” and in a United States legal context, it 
refers to either “the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to 
care for themselves,” or “[a] doctrine by which a government has standing to 
prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen.”48  This forms the foundation for why 
legislatures and courts have felt confident in placing much power in the attorney 
general’s hands. 
B. How the Trustee and the State Attorney General Interact: Basic 
Requirements and Conclusions Across Several States 
The trustee of a charitable trust must adhere to many of the same duties that 
are incumbent upon the trustee of a private express trust.49  However, trustees of 
                                                                    
44  See Jennifer L. Komoroski, Note, The Hershey Trust’s Quest to Diversify: Redefining the State 
Attorney General’s Role When Charitable Trusts Wish to Diversify, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1769, 1781–82 
(2004) (explaining that prior to the enactment of the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses, attorneys 
general in England were enforcing charitable trusts when the community had an interest in those 
trusts).  See generally Rita W. Cooley, Predecessors of the Federal Attorney General: The Attorney General 
in England and the American Colonies, 2 Am. J. Legal Hist. 304, 307 (1958) (explaining how the 
attorney general’s position gained prestige in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and his 
authority became more narrowly defined as that of “an adviser to the government as a whole or 
attorney for the Crown”). 
45  See sources cited supra note 44.  
46  See Komoroski, supra note 44, at 1782.  
47  See id. 
48  Parens patriae, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
49  See C.P. Jhong, Annotation, Duty of Trustees of Charitable Trust to Furnish Information and Records 
to Attorney General Relating to Trust Administration, 86 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1375 (2017); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 379 (Am. Law Inst. 1959) (explaining that some of the 
trustee’s duties are to administer the trust, to keep clear and accurate accounts of the trust, to use 
“reasonable care and skill to preserve the trust property,” and to keep the trust property separate 
from the trustee’s individual property). 
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charitable trusts have to follow certain rules regarding information that the state 
attorney general is allowed to request in order to administer the trust.50  A survey of 
cases from several states—New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, 
and Washington—indicates that when so required, the attorney general must make 
a “reasonable and proper demand” to the trustee for such information or records 
pertaining to the trust.51 
For example, in State v. Taylor,52 the Washington Supreme Court held that the 
Attorney General had standing to bring legal action against a charitable trust’s 
trustees in order to gather information about the trust’s administration, “provided 
that the demand [was] not unreasonable in view of the circumstances and the 
nature and status of the particular trust.”53  The court reasoned that this was valid 
even when the trustees had properly followed their duties to annually publish the 
records of their accounts.54  Significantly, the Attorney General could exercise this 
power because he or she represented the public, “particularly . . . those individuals 
who might be specially benefited” by the trust.55 
Trustees in New Hampshire have met similar outcomes.  In Souhegan National 
Bank v. Kenison,56 the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the trustee of a 
charitable trust had some duty to inform and make an accounting to the Attorney 
General, but either party could seek relief in the superior court “in the event of 
conflicting claims whether or not the trustee had acted or proposes to act within the 
legitimate sphere of his [or her] authority.”57  Notably, the court reached this 
conclusion even as it acknowledged that the Attorney General’s Office was, overall, 
“unorganized and unequipped to enforce [charitable trusts] in a comprehensive 
scheme under supervisory arrangement.”58  The court seemed to imply that the need 
for oversight from the Attorney General outweighed the need for improvement in 
the Attorney General’s Office regarding the administration of charitable trusts. 
                                                                    
50  See Jhong, supra note 49, at 1. 
51  See id. 
52  362 P.2d 247 (Wash. 1961). 
53  Id. at 252. 
54  See id. at 252–53. 
55  Id. at 252. 
56  26 A.2d 26 (N.H. 1942). 
57  Id. at 30. 
58  Id. 
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Additionally, a case involving the Barnes Foundation in Pennsylvania59 
bolstered the state Attorney General’s power by affirming that the Attorney General 
had the authority “to inquire into the status, activities, and functioning of public 
charities.”60  In Commonwealth v. Barnes Foundation,61 the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania reversed an order denying a petition filed by the Attorney General for 
citation, calling upon the Barnes Foundation and its trustees to show cause why 
they should not open an art gallery to the public when the donor had expressed an 
intention that the gallery should be open to the public within certain restrictions.62  
Furthermore, the court held that the Attorney General’s Office was allowed to 
conduct “suitable discovery”—to obtain the Barnes Foundation’s books and 
records—to the extent necessary to protect the rights of the general public.63  Again, 
one can see the consistent theme of how the state attorney general has the power to 
protect the public’s interest when the activities of a charitable trust’s trustees come 
into question. 
While the theme of granting the attorney general seemingly significant powers 
when it comes to the administration of charitable trusts runs consistently 
throughout many jurisdictions, there are occasional exceptions.  In Buell v. 
Gardner,64 the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court held that the 
Attorney General could not compel the trustee to hand over the distribution scheme 
of certain funds created by the testator’s will because there was no evidence that the 
trustee had not carried out his duties properly.65  The court relied on several facts of 
this particular case to come to this conclusion: the testator’s intent regarding the 
use of the charitable funds was clear, the trustee clearly understood his duties, and 
the trustee also had been granted some discretion in deciding to whom the funds 
                                                                    
59  See generally Our Mission and History, Barnes Found., https://www.barnesfoundation.org
/about [https://perma.cc/8BKC-SNLH] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).  Dr. Albert Coombs Barnes and 
his wife, Laura Leggett Barnes, established The Barnes Foundation in Merion, Pennsylvania, in 
1922.  Id.  They purchased an arboretum and built a gallery for their extensive art collection, as Dr. 
Barnes was a strong advocate for being educated in the arts.  Id.  The mission of the Foundation 
is to promote “the advancement of education and the appreciation of the fine arts and 
horticulture.”  Id.  The Foundation is now located in Philadelphia, and it still houses Dr. Barnes’s 
art collection, provides educational programs, and displays special exhibitions.  Id. 
60  Commonwealth v. Barnes Found., 159 A.2d 500, 505 (Pa. 1960).  
61  159 A.2d 500 (Pa. 1960). 
62  See id. at 501, 506. 
63  Id. at 506. 
64  153 N.Y.S. 1108 (App. Div. 1915). 
65  See id. at 1108.  
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should be distributed.66  The court seemed to be comfortable with this atypical 
outcome here because the terms of the trust—and, especially, the testator’s intent 
in her will—were very clear.  This likely explains why the court was more willing to 
give the trustee more discretion and limit the participation of the state Attorney 
General.  When the charitable trust seems susceptible to misuse or other problems, 
the attorney general will become more involved. 
I I I .  F R US T RAT I ON F OR NONPROF I T S  I N N E W HAMP S HI R E’ S  GA T E  C I T Y :  I N  
R E  N A S H U A  C E N T E R  F O R  T H E  A R T S  
A. Background of the Case 
The issue of whether nonprofit groups or other organizations have standing to 
sue for enforcement of a charitable trust became a controversial topic in Nashua, 
New Hampshire, in 2017.  The Nashua Center for the Arts (NCA) decided to transfer 
all of its remaining assets to the Currier Museum of Art located in Manchester, New 
Hampshire, but several local groups opposed that decision.67  The NCA had filed a 
petition with the probate court for “a decree of dissolution of the corporation 
pursuant to its Articles of Agreement,” or, in the alternative, an order under the cy 
pres doctrine to permit NCA to transfer its assets to the Currier Museum.68  In the 
meantime, five different groups filed motions to intervene: the City of Nashua, City 
Arts Nashua, Symphony New Hampshire, Nashua Choral Society, and Greater 
Nashua Chamber of Commerce.69  Judge Patricia B. Quigley, of the Ninth Circuit 
Probate Division in Nashua, denied these motions based on the court’s finding that 
those five groups did not possess “a direct and apparent interest, different from the 
members of the general public.”70  Instead, much to the disappointment of the City 
and the four nonprofits, the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office was 
responsible for representing their interests.71 
B. History of the NCA 
Understanding the history of NCA is an important first step before delving 
                                                                    
66  See id. 
67  In re Nashua Center for the Arts, No. 316-2017-EQ-00191, slip op. at 1 (N.H. Cir. Ct. 9th Prob. 
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more deeply into NCA’s plan to move its funds to the Currier Museum and the 
court’s decision to deny the motions to intervene.  The NCA, originally named the 
Arts and Science Center, was incorporated in March 1961 as a New Hampshire 
voluntary corporation.72  It successfully managed “a multi-faceted art, cultural[,] 
and educational facility” for over two decades.73  Unfortunately, in the early 1990s, 
financial difficulties overshadowed the group’s auspicious beginning.74  NCA 
gradually reduced its operations, and according to the court, it “eventually all but 
dissolv[ed].”75  However, around that time, the Edith Carter estate distributed 
$200,000 to the Nashua Charitable Foundation with the precatory request that 
those funds be used to support the NCA.76  The Edith Carter funds that were 
transferred to NCA, in combination with bequests and gifts from other donors, 
including members of the Carter family, had grown to at least $900,000 at the time 
of this suit.77  In its 2017 decision, the court noted that NCA was “essentially a non-
functioning charitable organization.”78  Its board of directors did not contain the 
requisite number of members, and the board had made some annual distributions 
to Nashua-area tax exempt entities for the arts, but those distributions paled in 
comparison to the funds that NCA actually possessed.79 
C. The Decision in the Probate Court 
NCA’s decision to move its funds to the Currier Museum created discord 
between NCA and the various Nashua community groups that each believed Edith 
Carter intended her money to go to them.80  NCA’s goal was to establish a 
permanent fund at the Currier to support art programs and educational activities 
to benefit the residents of the Greater Nashua area.81  The monies were to be 
                                                                    
72  N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 292:1 (LEXIS through 2018 Act 379); In re Nashua Center for the Arts, 
slip op. at 1.  In New Hampshire, a voluntary corporation or association may be formed by five or 
more people for a host of different purposes.  See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 292:1.  For example, some 
of the purposes include the promotion of “any charitable or religious cause” or “education and the 
arts and sciences by any other means or for mental improvement.”  Id. 
73  In re Nashua Center for the Arts, slip op. at 1. 
74  Id. at 2. 
75  Id.  
76  See id. 
77  Id.  
78  Id.  
79  See id. 
80  See id. at 4. 
81  Id. at 2. 
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monitored in a “restricted funds program,” so that the intent of Edith Carter to 
benefit the arts in Nashua would be honored.82  NCA informed the director of the 
Charitable Trust Unit at the Attorney General’s Office, and the director assented to 
NCA’s petition.83  However, the court stepped in once the City of Nashua and the 
four nonprofit groups filed their motions to intervene, and NCA and the Charitable 
Trust Unit of the Attorney General’s Office objected to the motions.84 
Judge Quigley’s order referred to several New Hampshire cases, in addition to 
Circuit Court Probate Division Rule 139, which states that “[a]ny person shown to be 
interested may become a Party to any proceeding on Motion briefly setting forth 
that Person’s relation to the Cause . . . .”85  In Brzica v. Trustees of Dartmouth College,86 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the 
petitions for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief brought by plaintiffs, seven 
alumni of Dartmouth College, against the College for an alleged misappropriation 
of alumni donations in order to change the structure of the College’s fraternities 
and sororities.87  On appeal, the plaintiffs also argued that the trial court erred in 
allowing the Association of Alumni of Dartmouth College to intervene in the case 
due to concerns the Association had about potential changes to the trustee election 
process.88  The New Hampshire Supreme Court could only overturn the trial court’s 
ruling if the plaintiffs demonstrated that the trial court’s “exercise of discretion 
[was] unsustainable.”89  The court held that the relief the plaintiffs sought against 
the College “would have a direct effect on the association,” and, therefore, upheld 
the trial court’s granting of the association’s motion to intervene as a sustainable 
exercise of discretion.90 
In contrast, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Scamman v. Sondheim91 
concluded that a party’s right “to intervene in pending litigation in this state has 
been rather freely allowed as a matter of practice without the aid of statute 
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85  Id. 
86  791 A.2d 990 (N.H. 2002). 
87  See id. at 992, 993.  
88  See id. at 993. 
89  Id. 
90  Id.  
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permitting it.”92  However, the Scamman court also emphasized that the trial court 
has discretion to grant or deny motions to intervene.93  Because the court found that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to intervene, the 
decision was affirmed.94 
Judge Quigley relied on the aforementioned case law and specific facts related 
to the NCA case to deny the five parties’ motions to intervene.95  Under New 
Hampshire common law, the Attorney General’s Office is responsible for 
“protect[ing] the rights of the public in a charitable trust.”96  Furthermore, “[t]he 
court will grant standing to intervene to a petitioner if, and only if, the petitioner 
has a direct interest in the outcome of the matter that is distinct from the interests 
of a member of the general public.”97  Counsel for the City of Nashua argued that the 
City had an interest in the case because the City would undoubtedly be concerned 
about making sure that funds raised for its citizens are used for that purpose.98  
Additionally, counsel for the four nonprofit organizations argued that those groups 
had a direct interest in the case because they were “potential beneficiaries” of NCA 
distributions.99 
Despite these arguments, the court denied the motions to intervene because the 
plaintiff-intervenors lacked “a direct and apparent interest, different from the 
members of the general public.”100  It found that the movants had not made a 
specific showing of how they would have been harmed if the funds went to the 
Currier Museum.101  The court also noted how the state’s Charitable Trust Unit had 
repeatedly tried to work with NCA to make the charity more compliant with 
requirements for its board and other management issues, but each attempt had 
failed.102  Judge Quigley concluded that the City of Nashua and the four nonprofits 
were trying to execute something similar to “a hostile takeover” by “wrest[ing] 
                                                                    
92  Id. at 330.  
93  Id. 
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95  See In re Nashua Center for the Arts, No. 316-2017-EQ-00191, slip op. at 3–5, 6 (N.H. Cir. Ct. 9th 
Prob. Div. Aug. 30, 2017). 
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control of th[e] organization from its founders.”103 
The court seemed to base its decision in part on the fact that NCA was no longer 
operating effectively, and the original intent of Edith Carter could be carried out 
more efficiently by moving the funds to the Currier Museum, even though that 
initially seemed contrary to her intended purpose of funding arts programs in 
Nashua.104  Furthermore, the Director of the Charitable Trust Unit had assented to 
NCA’s petition to move the funds before those five parties moved to intervene.105  
The court’s decision in this case bolstered the power of the Attorney General’s 
Office, and it gave a stamp of approval to the Office’s decision that NCA could 
relocate its funds without violating Edith Carter’s intent. 
I V.  A C OMP AR I S ON T O MAS S AC HUS E T T S :  HOW C OUR TS  HAVE  DE C I DE D 
S I MI L AR  QUE S T I ONS  I N  NE W HAMP S HI R E ’ S  N E I GHB OR  T O T HE  
S OUT H 
New Hampshire has some unique qualities that make it a desirable place for 
settlors to create trusts.106  Even more generally, many retirees are drawn to New 
Hampshire because the state has favorable debtor-protection laws and no state 
sales, income, or estate taxes.107  However, the state’s early adoption of more modern 
trust laws has been particularly noteworthy.108  The major changes came in 2006 
with the enactment of the Trust Modernization and Competitiveness Act (TMCA) 
with support from former Governor John Lynch.109  The text of the TMCA articulates 
the Act’s purpose to “establish New Hampshire as the best and most attractive legal 
environment in the nation for trusts and trust services” so that the state would 
attract high-paying jobs in the finance, estate planning, and related industries.110  
                                                                    
103  Id. 
104  See id. at 4–6. 
105  Id. at 3. 
106  See Joseph F. McDonald, III, Migrating Trusts to New Hampshire: The “Why” and the “How”, 51 
N.H.B.J. 34, 34 (2010). 
107  See id. 
108  See id. 
109  See id. 
110  N.H. S.B. 394, 2006 Gen. Ct., 159th Sess. (N.H. 2006).  Compare Mary Susan Leahy, New 
Hampshire’s New Trust Act a Boon to Local Businesses, McLane Middleton, 
http://www.mclane.com/thought-leadership/new-hampshires-new-trust-act-a-boon-to-local-
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The Act also reiterates how New Hampshire is capable of hosting “the most 
attractive legal and financial environment for individuals and families seeking to 
establish and locate their trusts and investment assets.”111  
Beyond New Hampshire, courts in other states have heard arguments from 
many parties who, like the groups in In re Nashua Center for the Arts, believed that they 
had a right to sue for the proper administration of a charitable trust.112  
Massachusetts courts are no exception.113  Because of New Hampshire’s unique 
qualities in the realm of trust law, juxtaposing New Hampshire with its closest 
neighboring state to the south provides an interesting comparison.  One might 
contemplate whether the New Hampshire laws on charitable trusts are notably 
different from those of another New England state due to New Hampshire’s 
adoption of the TMCA and desire to set an example for the rest of the country.114  
However, the Massachusetts cases that follow will show how New Hampshire and 
Massachusetts courts have addressed these charitable trust suits in similar ways. 
A. Dillaway v. Burton 
Dillaway v. Burton115 was decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
in 1926.116  The case concerned the will of Robert B. Brigham, which established a 
charitable corporation for the purposes of “maintaining an institution for the care 
                                                                    
wealth in perpetuity, and settlors could designate special fiduciaries such as “trust advisors” or 
“trust protectors”), with Michelle M. Arruda & William F. J. Ardinger, The Policy and Provisions of the 
Trust Modernization and Competitiveness Act of 2006, 47 N.H.B.J. 6, 14 (2006) (praising how the TMCA 
updated New Hampshire trust law, yet also asserting that several more changes were necessary 
for New Hampshire to stay competitive with other states).  In particular, the authors argued for 
the development of a formal and regular task force to constantly review New Hampshire’s trust 
laws and suggest future changes.  Arruda & Ardinger, supra. 
111  N.H. S.B. 394. 
112  See generally DeGiacomo v. City of Quincy, 63 N.E.3d 365, 367 (Mass. 2016) (holding that the 
state Attorney General was the only necessary party to an equity proceeding in an action brought 
by a successor trustee of a public charitable trust, the city and its historical society); In re Milton 
Hershey Sch., 911 A.2d 1258, 1259 (Pa. 2006) (holding that members of an alumni association of a 
charitable school wanting to rescind an agreement between the Attorney General and other 
parties had standing to do so); Russell v. Yale Univ., 737 A.2d 941, 943 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999) (holding 
that the settlor of a charitable trust did not retain a specific right to control the property and did 
not have standing for other specific rights related to administration of the trust). 
113  See discussion infra Part IV, sections A–C. 
114  See N.H. S.B. 394. 
115  153 N.E. 13 (Mass. 1926). 
116  Id. 
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and support and medical and surgical treatment of those citizens of Boston who 
[were] without necessary means of support and [were] incapable of obtaining a 
comfortable livelihood by reason of chronic or incurable disease or permanent 
physical disability.”117  Also at issue in the case was the will of Elizabeth F. Brigham, 
Robert Brigham’s sister.118  Her will provided that the “rest, residue and remainder 
of the net income” of her estate should be paid to the Robert B. Brigham Hospital 
for Incurables.119  The plaintiff was one of the trustees of Elizabeth Brigham’s will, 
and he was also a member of the hospital established by Robert Brigham’s will.120  
The plaintiff claimed that the hospital, a charitable corporation, was not being 
managed in accordance with the terms of Robert Brigham’s will.121  Specifically, he 
alleged that those managing the hospital had committed various abuses after the 
trustees had paid over the residue of Elizabeth Brigham’s estate.122  Moreover, the 
court decided a separate but related issue: whether the plaintiff could file a motion 
to intervene in a proceeding for a bill in equity for instructions brought by the 
hospital against the Attorney General.123 
For the first issue raised in this case, the Supreme Judicial Court relied on the 
Massachusetts law which required that the state Attorney General enforce 
charitable trust suits.124  The law in this area was “well settled,” and it was the 
Attorney General’s “exclusive function” to protect the public interest by repairing 
any abuses in a charity’s administration.125  The court also gave a succinct summary 
of the law regarding the Attorney General’s powers, which became a basis for later 
Massachusetts cases on this issue: 
The power and duty delegated to the Attorney General to enforce the proper 
application of charitable funds are a recognition by the Legislature not only of his fitness 
as a representative of the public in cases of this kind, but of the necessity of protecting 
public charities from being called upon to answer to proceedings instituted by 
individuals, with or without just cause, who have no private interests distinct from 
those of the public.126 
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Regarding the plaintiff-intervenor’s motion, the Supreme Judicial Court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision to deny the motion.127  The court explained that 
the decision to allow a motion to intervene “ordinarily rests in the sound judicial 
discretion of the presiding judge,” and the judge’s decision will only be reversed if 
“it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of such discretion.”128  This policy of 
giving the trial judge discretion is consistent with that of the aforementioned New 
Hampshire cases. 
At the same time, the Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged that there is a 
limited exception for when plaintiffs in these charitable trust cases do have 
standing.129  A “board of visitors” occasionally would be deemed to have enough of a 
special power or duty “in connection with general visitation functions” so that it 
could have standing in the enforcement of a charitable trust.130  This remote 
possibility did not apply to the Dillaway case because although Robert Brigham’s will 
created the charity and granted visitor powers to the trustees of the hospital, the 
plaintiff in this case was a trustee of Elizabeth Brigham’s will.131  Furthermore, 
Elizabeth’s will did not create the hospital, and because the plaintiff derived his 
standing from her will, his connection to the hospital was too tenuous for the board 
of visitors exception to apply.132  Learning about this exception provides some 
support for a more progressive viewpoint that state courts might eventually make 
the attorney general’s powers less absolute.  However, the nature of this exception 
here in Dillaway is very narrow, and the overall message to glean from this case is 
that Massachusetts has historically been consistent in adhering to the traditional 
rules about the attorney general’s power in the context of charitable trusts. 
B. Ames v. Attorney General 
In 1955, the Supreme Judicial Court decided another case, Ames v. Attorney 
General,133 where the plaintiffs sought redress in a charitable trust dispute—this 
time, concerning Harvard College’s Arnold Arboretum in what was formerly West 
Roxbury.134  In an indenture from 1872, the trustees of James Arnold’s will 
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transferred a fund to the president and fellows of Harvard College, for the purposes 
of establishing and maintaining the Arnold Arboretum, along with provisions for a 
specific professor who was to be responsible for managing the arboretum.135  The 
fund was successful—the endowment grew to $5 million, and the arboretum 
gradually included specimens from all over the world.136  However, this case’s 
controversy arose when Harvard College proposed to relocate the arboretum’s 
library and its herbarium department to Cambridge in order to blend those facilities 
with the College’s larger overall library and botany department.137  Those who 
opposed this relocation cited many different reasons, such as the move’s negative 
effect on future endowment donations and the possibility that arboretum income 
would be used for purposes outside the scope of permitted activities.138  Critics of 
the move also argued that even if those changes were beneficial to Harvard College, 
they would be harmful to the arboretum—and the funds were originally donated for 
the benefit of the arboretum, not the College.139  The plaintiffs went a step further 
and asked the Attorney General if they could use the Attorney General’s name in “an 
information” that would seek a declaratory decree.140  The Attorney General refused 
to allow the plaintiffs to use his name, as he felt that the trustees were acting in good 
faith and “within the bounds of reasonable judgment and sound discretion,” and, 
therefore, any litigation around such an issue would be “unreasonable and 
vexatious.”141 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the Attorney General’s refusal to allow his 
name to be included in the plaintiffs’ court documents “was a purely executive 
decision which is not reviewable in a court of justice.”142  The court emphasized how 
the Attorney General’s power in a charitable trust suit has been a longstanding tenet 
of Massachusetts’s case law, and the Attorney General is the only individual who can 
protect the interests of the public.143  Furthermore, a theme runs through the 
opinion: the attorney general’s oversight is a safer mechanism for charitable trust 
management and protection than allowing individuals to have more power in 
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charitable trust cases.144  The court warned that “‘it [cannot] be doubted that such a 
duty can be more satisfactorily performed by one acting under official 
responsibility than by individuals, however honorable their character and motives 
may be.’”145  Moreover, one of the purposes for vesting the power to bring suit in the 
“sole discretion of one officer” is to protect charitable trusts from being “exposed to 
attack from all sides.”146  Clearly, the court took a very protective stance here, almost 
to the point of showing distrust of the motives that individuals have when they 
lodge complaints about the management of a charitable trust. 
C. Weaver v. Wood 
Finally, in the late 1990s, the Supreme Judicial Court decided Weaver v. Wood147—
a case involving a dispute among members of the congregation of the First Church 
of Christ, Scientist, in Boston.148  The First Church of Christ, Scientist was founded 
by Mary Baker Eddy in 1879.149  The church is a public charity, as Eddy established it 
through a series of charitable trusts.150  In the first deed of trust that set up the 
Church’s board of directors, there were no specific references to individual Church 
members or any indications that members were considered beneficiaries.151 
Most importantly, Eddy later executed another deed of trust that established 
the Church’s Publishing Society “for the purpose of more effectually promoting and 
extending the religion of Christian Science.”152  In order to carry out this mission, 
the Publishing Society began publishing The Christian Science Monitor and later 
became involved with several radio programs.153  In the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
Publishing Society decided to expand into television, and it developed a plan for a 
network called “The Monitor Channel.”154  Unfortunately, this television venture 
failed significantly—the channel ceased operations in 1992 after generating over 
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$30 million in deficits in just one year of operation.155 
The plaintiffs brought legal action against the Church’s directors and the 
Publishing Society, alleging that the defendants violated their fiduciary duties when 
they authorized the television campaign.156  The plaintiffs argued that they had 
standing to bring this action because they were “life-long members in good 
standing” of the Church; however, they had no other special statuses.157 
The court reiterated its holdings in Ames and Dillaway: Massachusetts law 
required that the state Attorney General keep watch over charitable funds and 
ensure that those funds “are used in accordance with the donor’s wishes.”158  The 
court acknowledged that while the plaintiffs had a special relationship with the 
Church that would be different than the relationship that a general member of the 
public—who is not a member of the Church—would have, the court had “never held 
that membership in a public charity, alone, is sufficient to give standing to pursue 
claims that a charitable organization has been mismanaged.”159 
Additionally, just as the court opined in Dillaway, here the court alluded, in 
dicta, to the possibility that there are exceptions to this general rule.160  The court 
was quick to note, however, that those exceptions still require that the plaintiffs 
exhibit some special interest that the general public does not possess.161  These 
conclusions are not encouraging to plaintiffs like those in In re Nashua Center for the 
Arts, but at least the underlying message is consistent.  If a court does not feel that 
members of a church congregation have enough of a special interest to set those 
members apart from the general public, then it is challenging to argue that the 
constituents of the City of Nashua and the nonprofits concerned about the NCA 
trust had enough of a special interest either. 
V.  S OL UT I ONS :  I S  T HE  S T AT E  AT T OR N E Y  GE N E R AL ’ S  I NV OL V E ME NT  
P R OB L E MA T I C  OR  HE L P F UL ?  
After reviewing the case law, the next step is to consider the current theory on 
whether the state attorney general’s role needs to be reformed.  As this Note shows, 
the controversy at the heart of In re Nashua Center for the Arts involving the role of 
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state attorneys general has come up repeatedly in charitable trust jurisprudence.162  
Scholars have analyzed the role of the state attorney general and identified certain 
negative outcomes from how these attorneys general become involved in the 
administration of charitable trusts.163  At the same time, others are more optimistic 
and believe that attorneys general should not be removed entirely from the 
charitable trust landscape.164 
A. Arguments in Favor of Revoking the Attorney General’s Powers 
Due to the lack of time and other resources in state attorney general offices, 
there have been concerns about how state attorneys general may base their 
decisions on whether to ignore or pursue a charitable trust case based on which 
cases are most advantageous for their careers.165  In her Note, Jennifer Komoroski 
highlights several specific incidents where this conflict of interest has been at 
issue.166  For example, in a South Carolina case, the Attorney General demanded 
more stringent regulations, while the state’s physicians tried to block those 
regulations from being put into effect, claiming the Attorney General wanted to 
promote his own anti-abortion platform.167  People speculated about the motives of 
the Attorney General in Missouri when the infamous case of Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Public Health168 took place.169  The Missouri Attorney General 
allegedly remained in the trial proceedings just long enough to curry favor with the 
state’s pro-life voters before he eventually withdrew, and the state subsequently did 
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allow Cruzan’s family to terminate her life support.170 
State attorneys general are bombarded with diverse issues on a daily basis, and 
charitable trusts unfortunately tend to be overshadowed by other issues.171  
Additionally, state budgets often will not allocate more resources to help the 
attorney general’s office administer these charitable trusts, and budgets are 
typically incurring substantial deficits as it is.172  Kelly McNabb argues that these 
obstacles result in an imbalance where only the trusts that involve significant dollar 
amounts, highly visible media coverage, and “particularly reprehensible behavior” 
will be noticed by the attorney general’s office.173  This results in many noteworthy 
causes getting overlooked.174  Finally, one of the reasons accounting for the 
ineffectiveness of attorneys general is the way charitable organizations may be 
exempt from reporting and registration requirements.175  The rules on this may 
vary, but typically, certain organizations such as religious groups or churches, 
educational institutions, and hospitals are exempt from reporting and registration 
if the groups raise less than a particular amount each year.176  Therefore, even an 
attentive attorney general will likely miss violations involving those exempt groups, 
because he or she does not know about information that is not made available. 
B. Compromises: Supporting and Modifying the Attorney General’s Role 
It is clear that the possible harm resulting from the attorney general’s 
involvement—or deliberate lack thereof—in a charitable trust case can be quite 
damaging for the other parties in the matter.  On the other hand, some scholars have 
taken an approach focused more on compromise, asserting that the attorney 
general’s role should be modified and reforms be put in place before deciding to 
                                                                    
170  Id.  See generally Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261.  Nancy Cruzan was rendered permanently disabled as a 
result of an automobile accident, and she remained in a “persistent vegetative state” despite 
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became apparent that she had virtually no chance of recovering her cognitive faculties.”  Id. at 265.  
The parents received authorization from the state trial court, but the Missouri Supreme Court 
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Missouri Supreme Court’s decision.  Id. at 269, 286–87. 
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completely eliminate the attorney general’s involvement.  One such compromising 
approach is taken by Komoroski, which the following subsection explores in detail. 
1. Diversification of the Trust’s Investments  
First, Komoroski has outlined a set of steps that state attorneys general should 
follow before they go to court to enjoin a charitable trust’s diversification of 
investments: 
The state attorney general should be restricted from acting to halt the sale of a charitable 
trust’s investments when: (1) the charitable trust document specifically provides that the 
trustees have discretion in investing the trust assets, (2) the trustees of the charitable 
trust wish to fulfill their duty to diversify the trust assets and have acted in a manner 
consistent with the manner in which a prudent investor would act, and (3) upon 
examining the process by which the trustees attempt to diversify the trust assets, the 
attorney general is satisfied that the trustees have acted in such a way as to be protected 
by something analogous to the business judgment rule.  Consistent with the factors 
described above, the attorney general also should examine whether the trustees’ actions 
to diversify have combatted the settlor’s expressed intent in forming the charitable 
trust.177 
In the first step, the attorney general needs to give deference to the trustee of 
the trust if the settlor granted the trustee discretion regarding investments.178  If the 
attorney general interferes with the trustee’s valid exercise of power, then the lines 
between the parens patriae power and becoming a co-trustee would be blurred.179  It 
is critical that the attorney general not overstep this boundary.  At the same time, 
the attorney general should get involved when the trustee goes against the settlor’s 
explicit provisions for which types of investments would be authorized.180  This 
ensures that the attorney general would protect the settlor’s intent, and such 
protection is in keeping with one of the most central public policy themes in trusts 
and estate law. 
In step two, a distinction needs to be made between two types of restrictions on 
inception assets: express restrictions and implied restrictions.181  Sometimes, the 
language of a charitable trust will explicitly state that the trustee cannot sell the 
trust’s inception assets, and if that is the case, then the attorney general again may 
rightfully step in and rectify the situation.182  Examples from two cases illustrate this 
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point. 
The trust at issue in Commonwealth v. Barnes Foundation contained clear 
restrictions on its inception assets—the art collection of Dr. Albert Barnes.183  The 
Barnes Foundation indenture prohibited the institution of entrance fees to the art 
collection, “the construction of new buildings on the Foundation’s premises, and 
the loan or sale of any of the paintings under any circumstances short of physical 
deterioration.”184  In this case, the state Attorney General charged the trustees with 
failing to adhere to those specific restrictions.185 
In contrast, in the legal strife surrounding the Hershey Trust, the state Attorney 
General actually went against the settlor’s intent by arguing, vaguely, that the 
trustees’ choices “harmed the public as beneficiaries.”186  Mr. Hershey founded the 
Hershey Trust to provide education to underprivileged children, especially those in 
certain Pennsylvania counties.187  However, the language of the Hershey Trust did 
not indicate any restrictions on what the trustees could do with the inception assets 
(the Hershey common stock).188  Komoroski argues that the Attorney General in the 
Barnes Foundation case based such actions on the need for career advancement,189 
which, as mentioned above, is one of the most common assertions among scholars 
who want to minimize or totally eliminate the attorney general’s role in charitable 
trust suits. 
However, Komoroski also acknowledges that the attorney general should pay 
close attention to any implied restrictions that may be lurking in the settlor’s 
intent.190  In conducting this more nuanced analysis, the attorney general needs to 
consider whether selling those assets would be “inimical to the charitable purpose of 
the trust.”191  This determination should be narrow in scope—the attorney general 
should not have wide discretion, which is likely to once again lead to too many 
instances of these attorneys general making decisions for their own personal 
gain.192  Komoroski argues that the best way to keep the attorney general on track 
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with this part of the process is for him or her to concentrate on “the use of income 
from the trust assets.”193 
Finally, the third step is reached only if no other problems have been 
encountered during the first two steps in this process.194  The attorney general 
considers the overall picture of how the trustees plan to diversify the trust’s assets.195  
Komoroski suggests that at this third step, the attorney general should use a 
thought process similar to the “business judgment rule,” which is a concept from 
corporate law and has been codified in various forms throughout the states.196  
Generally, the business judgment rule provides corporate directors protection from 
liability by calling on courts to give strong deference to business directors in certain 
situations.197  In New Hampshire, the legislature has defined the business judgment 
rule as: 
[A] rebuttable presumption that a manager has not breached the manager’s duty of care 
if, in the matter in question, the manager has acted: (a) [i]n accordance with contractual 
good faith; (b) [i]n a manner the manager reasonably believed to be in the best interest 
of the limited liability company; and (c) [o]n the basis of reasonably adequate 
information.198 
Overall, Komoroski argues, the attorney general should be most concerned with 
whether the trustees made their decisions “in good faith and absent any 
wrongdoing.”199 
2. Other Arguments for the Attorney General to Maintain Some 
Power 
Despite the evidence of state attorneys general who wield or are perceived to 
wield too much power with charitable trust suits,200 there are some significant 
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reasons why attorneys general should play some sort of active role in these 
proceedings.  Some states have spread the duties of charitable trust enforcement 
among several authorities, such as state agencies, the secretary of state, or the state 
insurance commissioner.201  Other states have considered creating supervisory 
boards or organizations that could either be separate from the attorney general and 
provide a check on his or her power, or could report to the attorney general and fall 
under his or her authority.202  Interestingly, New Hampshire established a 
Charitable Trusts Unit as a department within the Office of the Attorney General in 
1943, and it was the first state to do so.203 
The mission of the New Hampshire Charitable Trusts Unit is “to protect the 
integrity of the charitable sector . . . through effective registration, licensing, 
education, and enforcement.”204  Additionally, the Unit is “the central repository” 
for information about charitable organizations, so it provides helpful resources for 
members of the general public.205  The staff at the Unit engage New Hampshire 
citizens in a variety of ways, such as writing articles for the New Hampshire Bar 
Journal and working with the New Hampshire Bar Association to conduct 
educational workshops on the issues affecting nonprofits.206  As of 2004, the Unit 
had overseen a significant number of transactions.207  For example, in 2003, over 
five thousand charitable trusts were organized, which was the highest number of 
charitable trusts registered in the state up until that year.208  Moreover, for the fiscal 
year ending June 30, 2000, the Unit calculated that the total aggregate value of 
registered charities native to New Hampshire was approximately $8.2 billion.209  
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After 2001, the value of charitable assets in New Hampshire gradually declined due 
to losses in securities markets.210  However, the data from the early 2000s show how 
the Unit has played a noteworthy role for nonprofits in New Hampshire. 
New Hampshire’s Charitable Trusts Unit has also been a vital force in the fight 
against telemarketer fraud,211 which exemplifies how the Unit has stayed true to its 
mission of safeguarding the integrity of the charitable sector.  In 1996, the Unit 
analyzed data on charitable donations made by New Hampshire residents through 
telemarketer phone calls, and the results showed that a shocking seventy-five 
percent of those donations went to for-profit telemarketer services.212  In 2003, as 
part of a joint effort with other state attorneys general, the Unit filed an amicus 
curiae brief in Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc.,213 which was argued before 
the United States Supreme Court.214  Several years later, the Unit again found that 
telemarketers targeting New Hampshire citizens for charitable donations were 
fraudulently keeping a large percentage of the donations, so the Unit has continued 
to educate the public and work with other state attorneys general on this problem.215 
Additionally, Komoroski argues that while attorneys general should avoid 
“bringing unnecessary suits against trustees of charitable trusts, especially in 
efforts to diversify,” the attorney general is “a necessary party to any suits brought 
against charitable trusts.”216  Some have argued that the attorney general’s 
involvement is critical because charitable trusts “lack definite ownership.”217  When 
compared to “definite shareholders” of for-profit corporations, beneficiaries of 
charitable trusts are sometimes “unable or disinclined to monitor the actions of the 
trustees.”218  Furthermore, having the attorney general’s oversight seems to give 
other parties peace of mind because it is less likely that entities are able to hold 
themselves out as charitable trusts without proper “inspection or supervision.”219  In 
states like New Hampshire, charitable trusts still receive oversight from the 
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Attorney General, while reaping additional benefits of having a staff at the 
Charitable Trusts Unit that can specialize in and devote more time to charitable 
trust issues. 
C ONC L US I ON 
After Judge Quigley’s decision in In re Nashua Center for the Arts, one can 
understand why the City of Nashua and the other local nonprofits felt they had lost 
their voice in a critical legal, social, and cultural matter.  Edith Carter had wanted 
the trust’s funds to benefit the arts in Nashua.  Furthermore, groups like the Greater 
Nashua Chamber of Commerce and Symphony New Hampshire likely felt as though 
they had been separated from money which was meant to go directly to them, or, at 
the very least, money over which they would be able to exercise some control.  But 
the court did not view the case from their perspective. 
This Note has shown how the long history of attorney general involvement in 
charitable trusts has remained consistent.  Attorney general oversight is not 
without its flaws; however, courts have endeavored to consistently and fairly apply 
the law in a way that emphasizes the notion that due to charitable trusts’ benefits to 
the public, the public interest is protected by the attorney general.  Citizens—both 
individually and as organized groups—could benefit from considering ways to 
work with the attorney general by making him or her more of an ally and finding 
common ground in order to have more success in charitable trust suits.  For 
example, citizens can actively get involved with the Charitable Trusts Unit and learn 
about the Attorney General’s objectives for managing charitable trusts in the state.  
People who are concerned about the current system also can advocate for some of 
the specific reforms explained earlier in this Note, such as forming a state agency 
or other secondary group that not only would provide a check on the Attorney 
General’s power, but also would make the workload for the Attorney General’s Office 
more manageable. 
Members of the Nashua community are unable to elucidate exactly what Edith 
Carter wanted her progeny to do with her estate, as she is no longer alive.  Her stated 
intent was to benefit the arts in Nashua.  If she were alive during the In re Nashua 
Center for the Arts decision, she may have agreed that the funds would be utilized in 
the most efficient way at the Currier Museum.  However, like many estate planning 
issues, the dilemma of no longer being able to achieve total clarification from the 
individual settlor herself continues to perplex the other parties involved.  While the 
City of Nashua and the nonprofits that tried to intervene did not obtain the outcome 
they had hoped for, the court properly applied the existing law, and until a better 
solution is implemented, that consistency is valuable. 
